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EVENING THE PLAYING FIELD:
TAILORING THE ALLOCATION OF THE
BURDEN OF PROOF AT IDEA DUE
PROCESS HEARINGS TO BALANCE
CHLDREN'S RIGHTS AND
SCHOOLS' NEEDS
Abstract: The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (the "IDEA")
is a broad federal mandate intended to make a "free appropriate public
education" available to all disabled students. More importantly, however,
the IDEA encourages schools to enable parents to collaborate with their
child's educators. In the event that parents and educators disagree about
a child's educational plan, the IDEA channels this conflict through an
administrative appeals process. But despite the fact that the IDEA's due
process hearing is one of its most prominent procedural safeguards, the
IDEA fails to specify which party bears the burden of proof during the
proceedings. The existing conflict of authority regarding the allocation
of the burden of proof at due process hearings must be resolved in order
achieve the IDEA's mandate. A modified burden-shifting scheme would
best mirror the IDEA's delicate balancing of the rights of disabled
children and the need to impose a realistic mandate on school districts.
INTRODUCTION
Originally enacted in 1975, the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (the "IDEA") created a broad federal mandate to make
"a free appropriate public education" available to every disabled stu-
dent.' To this end, the IDEA allocates federal funding to state educa-
tional agencies, contingent upon their schools' compliance with nu-
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A) (2000). The IDEA was originally promulgated as the Edu-
cation for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400). During the 2003 to 2004 school year, approxi-
mately 6.5 million students received educational services through the IDEA, with states
receiving more than $9 billion in aid. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-879,
REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PEN-
SIONS, U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: IMPROVED TIMELINESS AND BETTER USE OF EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN EDUCATION'S MONITORING SYSTEM 1 (2004),
available at http://wwwgao.gov/new.items/d04879.pdf.
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merous statutory requirements. 2
 More importantly, however, the
IDEA contemplates a process whereby schools enable parents to col-
laborate with their child's educators to better serve their child's
needs.3
 Thus, one of the IDEA's central requirements is that recipient
schools develop an individualized education program (an "IEP") for
each disabled student. 4
 Essentially, an IEP is a written plan detailing
how the school intends to provide the student with the IDEA's re-
quired "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE"). 5
Ideally, the IEP represents the product of a cooperative process
between the school and the student's parent(s). 6
 Nevertheless, as a
significant volume of litigation attests, the IEP process can produce
vigorous conflicts between school officials and parents.? The circum-
stances of one recent case are particularly illustrative. 8 In the year ap-
proaching his entry into eighth grade, the parents of Brian S. sought
to have his eligibility for special education services evaluated by a lo-
cal public middle school. 9
 Brian had been diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and learning disabilities.° After an ini-
tial evaluation, the school issued an IEP, which proposed that Brian be
enrolled in special education classes and receive speech therapy." Af-
ter Brian's parents expressed their concern with the school's class
sizes, the committee modified the plan to permit Brian to receive the
2 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
3 See id. § 1414(b).
4 Id. § 1414(d).
5 See id. §§ 1400(d) (1)(A), 1414(d). One of the most important requirements of the
IDEA, the IEP is an educational roadmap, as it details the student's present level of func-
tioning and sets out both long- and short-term educational objectives. Id. § 1414(d); see
Barbara J. Morgan, Case Comment, Burden of Proof—A School Board Bears the Burden of Prov-
ing That the Education of a Handicapped Child Is "Appropriate" Under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975: Lascari v. Board of Education of Ramapo Indian Hills
Regional High School District, 116 N.J. 30, 560 A.2d 1180 (1989), 22 RUTGERS LJ. 273, 278
(1990). The IDEA's FAPE mandate has been interpreted to require that the local educa-
tion agency provide the student with ''some educational benefit," simply a "basic floor of
opportunity." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189-201 (1982). Thus, the IDEA does
not affirmatively require U.S. public schools to provide handicapped students with educa-
tional programs designed to maximize their educational potential. See id. at 198.
5 See Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen Bond Coriell, Traversing the Sisyphean Trails of the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children's Act: An Overview, 18 OHIO N.U. L. Rev. 571, 593-94 (1992).
7 Judith DeBerry, When Parents and Educators Clash: Are Special Education Students Entitled
to a Cadillac Education?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 504-05 (2003).
See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 450-52 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1300 (2005).
Id. at 450.
10 Id. Until that time, Brian had attended a local private school. Id.
11 Id. at 450-51.
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same services at another school within the system in smaller classes.' 2
Despite this proposed modification, Brian's parents rejected the IEP
and chose to enroll him in a private schoo1. 13
The IDEA channels this type of parent-educator conflict
through an administrative appeals process, one of its most promi-
nent procedural safeguards." But despite the IDEA's otherwise
specific procedures, it is silent on a crucial threshold issue—
specification of the burden of proof borne by each party at its initial
administrative due process hearing. 15 This omission introduces an
awkward tension, because the IDEA outlines extremely specific due
process provisions yet fails to specify the burden of proof for the
administrative and court proce'edings those provisions create. 16 In
Brian's case, this issue stimulated a lengthy series of appeals con-
cerning which party is to bear the burden of proof at administrative
due process hearings under the IDEA. 17
In July 2004, the U.S. Court'of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
solved Brian's case by allocating the burden of proof to the parents as
the party challenging the school's IEP. 18 In doing so, the court wid-
ened the existing split among the federal circuit courts of appeals re-
garding the proper allocation of the burden of proof at this stage in
the IDEA appeals process. 19 Relying on a theory of implied legislative
II Id.
w Weast, 377 F.3d at 451.
14 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2000). Roughly 11,000 due process hearings were requested
during the period of 1996 to 2002. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 12.
15 See Thomas F. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can't Agree, Who Really Decides?
Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review Unce'  the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 36
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 72 (1987-1988). In outlining its impartial due process hearing and
administrative procedures, the IDEA does not make reference to the burden of proof at the
due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415. In describing the parent's right to bring a civil
action to enforce the IDEA's requirements; the IDEA only provides for the standard of re-
view that governs at appeals beyond the initial due process hearing, which is a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. Id. § 1415(i) (2) (B) (iii). Given the IDEA's procedural com-
plexity, this Note confines its analysis to the allocation of the burden of proof at due process
hearings under the IDEA. See id. § 1415; see infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text,
16 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68-69.
17 See Weast, 377 F.3d at 451-52.
16 Id. at 456.
19 See id.; see also Devine v. Indian River ,County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th
Cir. 2001); Renner v. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999); Walczak v. Fla. Union
Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist„ 135 F.3d 566, 569
(8th Cir. 1998); Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch.' Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1994);
Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1993); Johnson v.
Indep. Sch, Dist., 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186,
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intent and emphasizing the school district's greater experience and
resources, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits allocate the burden of proof to the school district
to defend its IEP's adequacy.2° Declining to venture beyond tradi-
tional evidentiary doctrine without a firmer congressional mandate,
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits allocate the burden to the party that challenges
the IEP or seeks to change the status quo, typically the parent. 21
Resolution of this issue is necessary for the IDEA's continued effec-
tiveness because the due process hearing is among its most fundamen-
tal procedural safeguards. 22
 At these hearings, the allocation of the
burden of proof often determines the outcome, especially when the
proceedings involve closely contested battles of expert testimony re-
garding the student's needs.25
 But foremost, the IDEA's procedural and
substantive requirements must complement each other in order for the
statute to serve as an effective mandate. 24 By granting disabled students
the right to a "free appropriate public education" supported by proce-
dural safeguards, the IDEA struck a delicate balance between protect-
ing the rights of disabled children and imposing realistic obligations on
school districts.25
 This Note argues that the allocation of the burden of
1191 (6th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 917 (1st Cir. 1983);
Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1983).
2° Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; E.S., 135 F.3d at 569; Clyde K, 35 F.3d at 1398-99; Fuhr-
mann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35.
21 Weast, 377 F.3d at 456; Devine, 249 F.3d at 1291-92; Renner, 185 F.3d at 642; Johnson,
921 F.2d at 1026; Doe v. Defendant 1, 898 F.2d at 1191; Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722
F.24 at 917; Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830. Although in most cases the party challenging the status
quo will be the student's parent, in some instances it is possible that the school district will
assume the position of the challenging party. See Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830-31.
25 See Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Re-
strictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 280-81 (1994). The due process hearing is essential
because it represents the primary mechanism by which parents can enforce a school's
statutory obligation to provide their student with a PAPE. See Guernsey, supra note 15, at
70-71; Goldman, supra, at 280-81.
23 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68 (observing that the burden of proof significantly
influences the outcome of due process hearings); Elizabeth L. Anstaett, Note, Burden of
Proof Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 51 Outo ST. L.J. 759, 759 (1990)
(explaining that the allocation of the burden of proof can determine the outcome of a
hearing because educational placements are the subject of expert disagreement); Rachel
Ratcliff Womack, Comment, Autism and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Are
Autistic Children Receiving Appmpriate Theatment in Our Schools?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 189,
192-93 (2002).
24 See Daniel & Coriell, supra note 6, at 594.
23 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d), 1415 (2000); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68; Anstaett, supra
note 23, at 759; Womack, supra note 23, at 192-93.
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proof at IDEA due process hearings should achieve this same balance. 26
Specifically, a proper allocation would still impose the evidentiary onus
on the plaintiff but would also incorporate burden-shifting to level the
evidentiary playing field between school districts and parents. 27
Part I of this Note traces the origin and evolution of the IDEA's
various safeguards." It focuses on the two federal district court cases
that gave rise to the IDEA and how they allocated the burden of proof
at the initial administrative hearing." Part I also reviews the IDEA's
procedural safeguards to highlight their extensive commitment to
due process." Part II details the debate among the federal circuit
courts of appeals and scholars that have addressed the allocation of
the burden of proof at IDEA due process hearings." Part II.A presents
the rationales of the federal circuit courts of appeals that allocate the
burden to the local education agency.32 Part II.B presents the ration-
ales of those circuits that allocate the burden to the challenging
party." Part H.0 outlines the major scholarly proposals for possible
allocations." Finally, Part III presents a proposal for resolving this
conflict that is most consistent with the IDEA's statutory framework."
I. THE IDEA's PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN PERSPECTIVE
Two federal district court cases preceded the enactment of the
IDEA in 1975." In 1972, in Pennsylvania Assfrn for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania (PARC), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania became the first federal court to hold that
handicapped students possess a right to a free public education that
cannot be denied without due process." The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia reached a similar conclusion in 1972
25 See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 36-75 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 76-187 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
33
 See infra notes 108-140 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 141-187 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 203-219 and accompanying text.
" See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866,866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 343 F. Supp. 279, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
37
 343 F. Supp. 279 at 293-95; see Andriy Krahmal et al., "Additional Evidence" Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigar, 9 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 201,201
(2004); Anstaett, supra note 23, at 759-60.
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in Mills v. Board of Education. 38
 Before these decisions brought the needs
of disabled children to Congress's attention, the U.S. public education
system systemically underserved and excluded such students. 39 The al-
location of the burden of proof in these cases remains relevant because
the IDEA ultimately reflected much of PARC and Mills."
In Mills and PARC, classes of handicapped students sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief to obtain a public education.'" Once
the defendant's liability had been established in each case, the district
courts oversaw the fashioning of judgment orders to integrate handi-
capped children into the public education system and prevent their
future exclusion.42 PARCs Amended Stipulation and the Mills Judg-
ment Decree both outline many procedural protections that the IDEA
later incorporated." For example, both orders mandated a due proc-
ess hearing and detailed its procedures with specificity."
The PARC order addressed at some length the evidentiary stan-
dards for the due process hearing it mandated." First, it required sub-
stantial evidence to support a proposed change in any handicapped
student's status." More importantly, however, it provided that the
school district's production of an official report would "discharge its
burden of going forward with the evidence."47 Further, the order
38 See 348 F. Supp. at 873-76.
" See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2) (A)—(E) (2000). Notably, the congressional findings
codified in the IDEA state that prior to its enactment, one million American children with
disabilities were entirely excluded from public schools. Id. § 1400(c) (2) (C); see DeBerry,
supra note 7, at 508-09.
40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877-83; PARC 343 F. Supp. at 293-97; An-
staett, supra note 23, at 760.
41 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281-82.
42 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877-83; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302-06.
43 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877-83; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302-06. See generally 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415 (outlining procedural safeguards). Like the IDEA, the Mills judgment Decree re-
quired school districts to formulate educational proposals for each student. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414 (d) (2); 348 F. Supp. at 879. Similarly, Mills also required schools to send a proce-
dural safeguards notice, informing parents of their appeal rights in the event of a dispute.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (d) (2) ( j); 348 F. Supp. at 879. Mills' hearing procedures, including its
provisions regarding the contents of the safeguards notice, the parent's right to counsel,
and the impartiality of the hearing officer, are largely similar to those of the IDEA. See 20
U.S.C. § 1 1415(1); 348 F. Supp. at 880-83. PARCs Amended Stipulation contains highly
similar safeguards to those found both in Mills' and in the current IDEA. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 880-83; PARC 343 F. Supp. at 303-06.
" See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0, (h); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 880-83; PARC 343 F. Supp, at 302-06.
ts 343 F. Supp. at 305,
42 Id.
47 Id. This language appears to refer to the burden of producing evidence. See CHARLES
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 ( John W. Strong ed., West 5th ed. 1999).
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stated that upon the school district's production of such a report, the
parent would be required to introduce evidence to support his or her
position." Thus, insofar as the burden of production was concerned,
the PARC order contemplated a burden-shifting scheme in which the
school district and then the parents would be required to offer evi-
dence." Though the PARC order failed to specify which party was to
bear the ultimate burden of peisuading the trier of fact, at least one
court has read its allocation to indicate that this ultimate burden
would rest with the school district."
An equivalent portion of.the Mills order also addresses the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof." In outlining hearing procedures, the
Mills court required the school district to bear the burden of proof
regarding any educational placement, denial, or transfer at issue in
the hearing. 52
 In sum, both of these common law predecessors to the
IDEA allocated at least the initial burden of producing evidence to
the educational agency rather than to the challenging party." More-
over, the Mills court explicitly assigned both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion to the school district."
The IDEA grafted many of Mills and PARCs proposed procedural
safeguards to ensure that the rights of students and their parents would
be adequately protected." On the whole, these safeguards focus on two
important areas." First, they ensure schools' procedural compliance in
identifying and formulating IEPs for disabled students. 57
 Second, they
provide a dispute resolution mechanism to address any conflicts that
emerge during the TEP process—the due process hearing. 58 As an ini-
48 PARC 343 F. Supp. at 305.
48 See id.
55
 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1300
(2005); see PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
5 ' 348 F. Supp. at 880-83.
55 See id. at 881.
" See id.; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
" See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 881.
55 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (b) (2000); see also id. § 1415 (codifying procedural safe-
guards); supra note 43 and accompanying text (detailing the IDEA's codification of its case
law predecessors' safeguards).
55 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (outlining procedural safeguards).
57 See id. §§ 1415(d) (mandating that school district issue a "procedural safeguards no-
tice" upon the student's initial referral), id. § 1415(b) (1) (requiring school district to allow
parent to participate in all meetings regarding the student's educational placement); id.
§ 1415(b) (3) (requiring school district to provide parent with written notice regarding
changes to the student's EP).
38 See id. § 1415(e) (authorizing state and local educational agencies to provide media-
tion services to parents); id. § 1415(f) (outlining "impartial due process hearing" and its
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tial step, the IDEA requires that a "procedural safeguards notice" be
provided to the parent upon the student's initial referral for evalua-
tion." This notice must contain a full, plain language explanation of
the student's rights."
Once the student is evaluated, the parent retains the right to par-
ticipate in all meetings regarding the child's placement or services. 61
In addition, parents are entitled to receive prior written notice when-
ever the school proposes to change the student's IEP or refuses to ac-
commodate a request for a change." Furthermore, parents are able
to obtain a free independent educational evaluation of their child,
and they are entitled to examine all their child's records.• Beyond
these procedural mechanisms, the IDEA also authorizes funding for
information centers designed to assist parents in learning about how
the statute might accommodate their child's needs."
Should a dispute arise during the IEP process, parents can request
an impartial due process hearing." Upon the filing of a hearing re-
quest, the school must offer parents the option of free mediation, and
it must also notify them of any available community services that might
assist them." If the hearing proceeds, the IDEA requires the disclosure
of any evaluations between the parties at least five days prior to the
hearing date." At the hearing, parents may be represented by counsel
and have the right to present evidence, confront witnesses, and obtain
findings of fact. 60
 Though the hearing decision is enforceable against
the parties, either party can appeal the outcome by bringing a civil ac-
procedures); id. § 1415(g) (detailing parties' appeal rights); id. § 1415(h) (establishing
safeguards that will govern hearings and appeals, including parental right to counsel, pre-
sent evidence, and cross-examine witnesses).
59
 See id. § 1415(d).
eo See id.
61 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (2000).
62 Id. § 1415(b)(5). Among other requirements, such notices must contain a descrip-
tion of the action proposed or refused, the school's justification for the action, and a
statement relating the IDEA's procedural safeguards. Id. § 1415(c) (1)—(7).
6' Id. § 1415(b)(1).
64 Id. § 1482.
65
 Id. § 1415(f)—(g). This provision allows a state to elect to have either a one- or two-
tiered administrative appeals structure. See id. The due process hearing may be conducted
by either the local or state educational agency, as determined by either state law or by the
policy of the state agency. Id. § 1415(f). Thus, a state can elect to have a single hearing
conducted by either the local or state educational agency, or two hearings—one at the local
level and then a second at the state level. See id.
66
 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (c)(7), (e) (2000).
/d. § 1415(f) (2).
§ 1415(h).
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tion in either state or federal coUrt. 63 Prevailing parents are entitled to
petition for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees."
In contrast to both Mills and PARC s procedural provisions, the
IDEA fails to address the burden of proof at the due process hear-
ing. 7I This omission gives rise to a question of statutory interpretation:
does the IDEA express an implied congressional intent to incorporate
the type of allocation to the school district outlined by Mills and PARC
? 72 Or should the IDEA's silence be interpreted to express an adher-
ence to a traditional allocation of the burden of proof?" In requiring
the plaintiff, typically the parent, to bear the burden of proof, one
group of federal circuit courts of appeals emphasizes traditional evi-
dentiary principles and limits its statutory inquiry to Congress's ex-
press intent.74 In assigning the burden of proof to the school district,
the remaining circuits rely on an y implicit reading of Congress's intent
and find that policy considerations warrant a departure from the tra-
ditional allocation of the burden of proof."
II. DIVERGENT READINGS OF THE IDEA's LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND
THE PROPER ROLE OF TRADITIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
What most courts and scholars refer to as the "burden of proof'
actually encompasses two burdens, 7° First is the burden of production,
69 Id. § 1415 (i) (2) (A).
n Id. § 1415 (1) (3) (B).
71 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 72.
72 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 881; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
73 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 69, 72.
14 See Weast, 377 F.3d at 456; Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289,
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2001); Renner v. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999); John-
son v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Defendant 1, 898 F.2d
1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 917 (1st Cir. 1983);
Tatra v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1983).
73 See Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); E.S. v. In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998); Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d
1396, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1994); Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1034-
35 (3d Cir. 1993).
76 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 336. Typically there is a relationship between the two
burdens because the party charged with the burden of production usually assumes the
burden of persuasion as well. See id. § 337. In addition, the burden of persuasion is often
more determinative because it is the ultimate evidentiary burden and has a critical impact
in cases "where the trier of fact is actually in doubt." Id. § 336. The burden of proof, how-
ever, is an ambiguous term. See id. Given the ultimate significance of the burden of persua-
sion, many references to the "burden of proof* can be read to refer primarily to the bur-
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or the burden of bringing forth sufficient evidence regarding a fact at
issue." Second is the burden of persuasion, or the ultimate burden of
convincing the fact finder in satisfaction of the applicable standard of
proof.78
 Under traditional evidentiary doctrine, courts allocate both
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion to the plain-
tiff: 78
 The rationale is that the plaintiff is the one seeking to change
the present state of affairs and thus is the most logical party to risk a
failure of proof."
Nevertheless, there is no hard and fast rule governing the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof." Fairness, convenience, or other policy
considerations can justify a nontraditional allocation, that is, an as-
signment of the burden to the defendant. 82 Consequently, the IDEA's
silence as to which party should bear the burden of proof at its due
process hearings provokes a central question: do special considera-
tions justify a nontraditional allocation of the burden of proof to the
school district?83
 In formulating a response to this question, the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals rely on divergent sources." Some circuits
stress school districts' affirmative obligations to students under the
IDEA and present fairness arguments regarding the parties' respec-
tive advantages as IDEA litigants. 88 Others reaffirm a traditional allo-
cation by strictly construing the IDEA's legislative intent and empha-
den of persuasion. See id.; 9 J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2485
( James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981).
" McColusucx, supra note 47, § 336.
78 Id.
" See id. § 337.
a° See id.
81
 See id. Professor J.H. Wigmore's treatise states that "[t] he truth is that there is not
and cannot be any one general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of policy and
fairness based on experience in the different situations." WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 2486.
82 SeeMcCoRmicK, supra note 47, § 337. In addition, although it is most natural to place
the burden on the party who urges change, it can also be appropriate under certain circum-
stances to impose the burden of proof on a party when the facts with regard to a certain issue
lie particularly within that party's knowledge. See id. According to Professor Charles McCor-
mick, this proposition is a near-exception to the traditional rule. Id. Nevertheless, a party can
still be required to plead and prove matters in circumstances where the opposing party re-
tains the relevant proof. Id. Additionally, it may be warranted under certain circumstances to
allocate the two evidentiary burdens to different parties or to shift the burdens. Id.
85 SeeMcCoRmicx, supra note  47, § 337.
84 See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1300 (2005) (relying on traditional evidentiary doctrine and a narrow construction of
Congress's legislative intent); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207, 1218-20 (3d Cir.
1993) (emphasizing the IDEA's remedial purpose); Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th
Cir. 1983) (focusing on the IEP's central role and the issue of fairness).
85 See, e.g., Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218-20.
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sizing the protection already afforded by its procedural safeguards.°
The following discussion outlines these arguments along with leading
scholarly responses to this issue. 87
A. The Primacy of Policy Considerations Among Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals Allocating the Burden of Proof to the Local Educational Agency
Several federal circuit courts of appeals have simply declared that
they adhere to the rule that the school system must bear the burden of
proving its IEP's adequacy at the due process hearing 88
 Among the
courts that do so, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pro-
vides the clearest rationale.89 In developing its rationale, the Third
Circuit relied in part on a 1989 New Jersey Supreme Court decision
that first considered the issue, Lascari v. Board of Education." Lascari
allocated the burden of proof to the school district because the IDEA
charges it with the responsibility for implementing 1EPs." According
to the Lascari court, this allocation was most consistent with the IDEA's
extensive procedural safeguards and also with the evidentiary consid-
eration that the burden of proof should be placed on the party best
able to meet it92
 Additionally, the court stressed that school districts
had educational experts at their disposal, already possessed the child's
records, and would be more familiar with the applicable state and fed-
eral law.93
In sum, the Third Circuit requires the school district to bear the
burden of showing that its placement is appropriate, regardless of
whether the school district or the parent is the party seeking change."
For this circuit, the affirmative nature of the IDEA's obligations for
school districts adequately justifies assigning them the burden of
9° See, e.g., Weast, 377 F.3d at 452-53; Tatra, 703 F.2d at 830.
97 See infra notes 88-97, 108-118, 141-147 and accompanying text.
88 See Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); E.S. v. In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998); Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d
1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
89 See Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir. 1995); Oberti, 995 F.2d at
1218-19; Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1993); see
also Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 1181-82, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (allocating the bur-
den of proof under New Jersey state law to the local school district).
9°
 See Fuhrinann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35 (citing Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1189).
91 See 560 A.2d at 1188. One commentator devotes an extensive discussion to a critique
of Lascari's holding. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 283-87.
92 See 560 A.2d at 1188.
93 See id.
94
 See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207, 1218-20; Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at
1034-35.
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proof.95
 In addition, the Third CirFuit relies on a related evidentiary
argument, holding that fairness requires the school district to bear
the risk of a failure of proof because it has superior access to the nec-
essary evidence and a greater capability to explain that evidence's
relevance.96
 Subsequently, the Third Circuit has applied its adoption
of Lascari's reasoning in a series of cases that affirmed an overriding
concern for the welfare of handicapped children.97
For example, in 1993 in Oberti v. Board of Education, the Third
Circuit held that the school district should bear the burden of proof
at both the due process hearing and at the district court level under
the IDEA.98
 In doing so, the court found that requiring parents to
prove that the school district has failed to comply with the IDEA
would undermine its explicit desire to protect disabled children's
rights.99
 The court stated that imposing such a burden on the parent
would diminish judicial enforcement of the IDEA's requirements.'°°
Finally, in citing a study that found parents are at a general disadvan-
tage in IDEA disputes because they usually lack the specific expertise
of their child's educators, the court emphasized the school district's
practical advantage in IDEA litigation. 191
as See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207, 1218-20; Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at
1034-35.
" See Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 £2d at 1187-88.
97 See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207, 1218-20.
99 995 F.2d at 1207, 1218-20. It is important to note, however, that an argument can be
made that Oberti's holding only pertains to the allocation of the burden of proof for a
specific type of IDEA claim. See id. Rather than concluding that the school district must
always bear the burden of proving its compliance with the IDEA, the court implied that the
school simply bears the burden of proving its compliance with the IDEA's mainstreaming
requirement. Id. at 1207, 1219. Essentially, the IDEA requires that children with disabilities
be educated in the least restrictive environment," meaning that they are to be educated in
settings that include nondisabled students wherever possible. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(a)
(2000). Thus, the IDEA articulates a strong preference for mainstreaming, that is, for edu-
cating disabled students in settings where they are able to benefit from interaction with
their nondisabled peers. See id. In Oberti, for instance, the parents alleged that the school
district violated the IDEA by placing their son in a segregated special education class due
to his disruptive behavior. 995 F.2d at 1206, 1208. The Third Circuit concluded that the
IDEA's strong presumption for mainstreaming would be contradicted if the burden of
proof was imposed on the parents for mainstreaming claims. Id. at 1219. The court rea-
soned that to do so would effectively require parents to prove their child should be in-
cluded in a less restrictive environment, which is plainly inconsistent with the IDEA's ex-
plicit preference for mainstreaming. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (a); Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
109 Id.
101 Id.
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The Third Circuit further refined its position in 1995, in Carlisle
Area School v. Scott P'°2 In Carlisle, the court refused to assign the burden
of proof to school districts for claims involving "mainstreaming," which
the IDEA explicitly prefers.'" Instead, the Carlisle court held that the
school district should not be required to bear the burden of proof when
it advocates for a less restrictive placement.'" Addressing the burden of
proof more generally, the court stated that although the school district
is required to prove affirmatively the appropriateness of its own IEP, it is
not required to prove the inappropriateness of an alternate plan that a
parent proposed.'" The court observed that this type of requirement
would impose too substantial of a burden on the school district.'"
Hence, although in Carlisle the Third Circuit recognized a narrow limi-
tation to its allocation, the court still ultimately affirmed its position that
the IDEA's affirmative obligations justify a nontraditional allocation of
the burden of proof to the school districts.'"
B. Siding with the Status Quo: The Reliance on Traditional Evidentiary
Principles Among the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Allocating
the Burden of Proof to the Challenging Party
Relying on a narrower reading of the IDEA's legislative intent, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was one of the first courts to
allocate the burden of proof to the challenging party.'" In 1983, the
First Circuit held in Doe v. Brookline School Committee that the party seek-
ing to modify the status quo should bear the burden of proof in pro-
ceedings under the IDEA.'" Applied to the facts presented in Doe, the
burden fell upon the school district because it was the party seeking to
alter the existing IEP by discontinuing payment for the student's pri-
vate school tuition.'" The court relied upon the congressional prefer-
ence for maintenance of the current educational placement to support
this allocation.w Specifically, the court interpreted the IDEA's "stay-
put" provision, which mandates that a student remain in his or her cur-
102 62 F.3d at 533.
1 °3 Id.
104
105 Id.
100 Id.
107
 See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 533.
um See Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 917 (1st Cir. 1983).
1°9 Id.
110 Id.
111 See id.
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rent educational placement during the pendency of any appeal, to ex-
press the IDEA's strong preference for the preservation of the status
quo. 112
 Accordingly, the court concluded that the most consistent allo-
cation of the burden of proof would be to the party seeking to modify
the placement that the IDEA otherwise preserves. 1 "
In contrast to the First Circuit's reliance on the IDEA's "stay-put"
provision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
has become the dominant rationale among the federal circuit courts
of appeals allocating the burden to the challenger)" In 1983, in Tatro
v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit first allocated the burden to the challenging
party, reasoning that the IEP's central role created a presumption in
favor of the placement it established. 115 In Tatro, the parents of a child
with spina bifida appealed a school district's denial of their request
for catheterization services so that she could attend a preschool pro-
gram.'" In holding that the district was required to amend the stu-
dent's plan to provide catheterization, the Fifth Circuit concluded in
an oft-quoted passage that "because the IEP is jointly developed by the
school district and the parents, fairness requires that the party attack-
ing its terms should bear the burden of showing why the educational
setting established by the IEP is not appropriate."117 The U.S. Courts
112 See id. at 915-17. The IDEA contains a so-called "stay-put" provision, whereby the
child is required to stay in his or her current educational placement during an appeal
unless the school district and the student's parents agree to an alternate placement. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2000). Some scholars, however, critique courts' reliance on the stay-put
provision as a justification for requiring the party challenging the status quo, typically the
plaintiff, to bear the burden of proof. See Dixie Snow Huefner & Perry A. Zirkel, Burden of
Proof Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 9 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
Enuc. L. REP. 1, 8 (1993). They contend that the stay-put provision does not establish a
presumption that the current placement is appropriate and, instead, they interpret the
provision's purpose to be shielding the student from being switched between multiple
placements during an appeal. See id.
113 See Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d at 917.
114 See Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001);
Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Defendant I, 898
F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1990); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790
F.24 1153, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986); Tatra, 703 F.2d at 830.
112 703 F.2d at 830.
II° Id. at 825.
117 Id. at 830; see Devine, 249 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Tatra); Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026
(same); Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191 (same); Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1158
(same). The reasoning the Fifth Circuit forwarded in Tatro has been critiqued by propo-
nents who urge courts to allocate the burden of proof to the school. See 703 F.2d at 830-31;
Anstaett, supra note 23, at 766; Womack, supra note 23, at 215. Anstaett and Womack both
stress that schools and parents hardly assume equal roles within the IEP development pro-
cess, making it inaccurate to characterize the plan as the joint product of all participants.
Anstaett, supra note 23, at 766; Womack, supra note 23, at 215.
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of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
since subscribed to Tatro's allocation of the burden." 9
Thus, Tatro implied that the IEP represents the joint product of
the school and the parents' efforts, embodying a sort of contract be-
tween them to an educational placement and package of services." 9
Adopting this premise, the court then required the party attacking the
plan to prove why it should be permitted to deviate from the terms it
had previously agreed to. 129 In Tatro, the school district had to demon-
strate why the placement it had endorsed—an early childhood educa-
tion program—was now inappropriate because the student's atten-
dance would require the school to provide catheterization services. 121
As a result, Tatro produced the counterintuitive result of imposing the
burden of proof on the school district. 122 In most cases, one would ex-
pect an allocation to the parent as the challenging party.' 23
113 See Weast, 377 F.3d at 456; Devine, 249 F.3d at 1291; Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026; Doe v.
Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191; Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830. The Fifth Circuit also derived this
allocation from the standard of review adopted by the then-leading Supreme Court prece-
dent in the area. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,206-07 (1982). In 1982, in Board
of Education v. Rowley, the Court held that the IDEA expressed a congressional intent to
defer to the expertise of state educators in determining how to educate handicapped chil-
dren appropriately. See id. at 206-08.
113 See 703 F.2d at 830.
12° See id.
121 See id. at 830-31.
122 See id. Interestingly, both the First and Fifth Circuits' allocations to the challenging
party resulted in imposing the burden of proof on the school district, not the parent. See
Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d at 915-17; Pura, 703 F.2d at 830-31. Though this
may be an insignificant parallel, it does suggest that factual happenstance, in addition to
the desire to adhere to traditional evidentiary rules, influences how courts address this
issue. See Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d at 915-17; Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830-31.
123 See Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830; see also McCoamicit, supra note 47, § 336 (explaining that
generally courts assign the burden of proof to the plaintiff because it is the party challeng-
ing the status quo). For instance, the court allocated the burden of proof to the parent as
the challenging party in the 1986 case of Alamo Heights v. State Board of Education, in which
the Fifth Circuit reiterated Tatro's essential holding that the party attacking the IEP's terms
should bear the burden of demonstrating why the setting it establishes is now inappropri-
ate. See Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1158; 74tro, 703 F.2d at 830. Alamo Heights slightly ex-
panded Taft, however. See Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1156,1158-59; Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830.
Although the parent in Alamo Heights had not presented any claims attacking the setting
contained in her son's IEP, the Fifth Circuit still allocated the burden of proof to her be-
cause she sought to add services to the agreed-upon plan. See 790 F.2d at 1156. Thus, the
court read Tatro to also impose the burden of proof upon a party that sought to add serv-
ices to the IEP. See id. at 1158-59; Tatra, 703 F.2d at 830; see also Christopher M. v. Corpus
Christi Ind. Sch. Dist., 933 F.2d 1285,1288,1290-91 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding likewise that
disabled student bore burden of proof because he sought to have his school day extended
to seven hours, rather than two hours as proposed in his IEP).
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In 1990, in Doe v. Defendant I, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in allocating the burden of proof
at due process hearings under the IDEA to the party attacking the
IEP's terms. 1 Y4 The Sixth Circuit has since refused to modify its appli-
cation of Tatro's holding. 125
 For instance, in 1990 in Cordrey v. Euckert,
the Sixth Circuit declined an invitation by the petitioning parents and
an amicus curiae to impose the burden of proof on issues pertaining
to procedural compliance under the IDEA to the school district.'"
Though the court acknowledged that the IDEA affirmatively required
the local educational agency to comply with its comprehensive proce-
dures, it found no definitive authorization within the IDEA itself or
any other compelling justification that would warrant a departure
from the traditional allocation of the burden of proof.' 21
In 2004, in Weast v. Schaffer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit similarly refused to deviate from the traditional rule
that the party initiating a proceeding bears the burden of proof. 128
 In
Weast, the parents of a student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder and learning disabilities challenged the adequacy of a
school's proposed IEP, seeking reimbursement for private school tui-
tion. 129
 In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit examined evidentiary doc-
trine, comparable federal statutory entitlements, and various policy
arguments.'" The court rejected opposing circuits' analyses that allo-
cated the burden of proof to the school district, concluding that those
decisions offered little supporting reasoning."'
Instead, the Weast court relied heavily on traditional evidentiary
doctrine, stating that the party seeking relief normally bears the bur-
den of proof when a statute is otherwise silent on the issue.'" In sup-
port, the court cited to both Charles McCormick's and J.H. Wig-
more's treatises to underscore that courts traditionally allocate the
burden of proof to the party who initiates a proceeding to enforce a
statutory obligation.'" In doing so, the court reasoned that the bur-
124 See Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191.
125 See Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1466 (6th Cir. 1990).
125 See id.
1 " See id. at 1466, 1469-70.
12a 377 F.3d at 456. On February 22, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the Fourth Circuit's decision in Weast. Schaffer v. Weast, 125 S. Ct. 1300 (2005).
122 377 F.3d at 450-51.
"° See id. at 452-56.
121 Id. at 453.
in Id. at 452, 455-56.
153 Id. at 452, 455; seeMcCoamicit, supra note 47, § 337; WIGM ORE, supra note 76, § 2485.
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den of proof should indicate which party should lose the action if no
evidence is offered by either party. 154 Thus, the court concluded that
to allocate the burden of proof to the school district would effectively
presume every IEP's inadequacy. 1 ss
Consequently, the Weast court rejected any contention that the
school district should bear the burden of proof because of its affirmative
statutory obligations under the IDEA.'" The court also refused to grant
weight to the practical consideration that school districts have the ad-
vantage in IEP litigation.'" Stating that "[w] e do not automatically as-
sign the burden of proof to the side with the bigger guns," the court
emphasized that the IDEA's procedural safeguards create a roughly level
playing field between parents and school districts.'" In particular, the
court highlighted parents' involvement in IEP development, their right
to examine records within the school's possession, and the ability of
prevailing parents to recover attorneys' fees.'" Thus, the court implied
that Congress accounted for a school district's potential advantages at
the hearing and chose to reduce any informational or resource advan-
tage through the IDEA's existing procedural protections. 10
C. Splitting the Difference: Existing Burden-Shifting Proposals
Several academic proposals have addressed the proper allocation
of the burden of proof at due process hearings under the IDEA."' As
this Section details, many proposed allocations favor some type of bur-
den-shifting scheme, whereby courts would separate the burdens of
production and persuasion and assign them to different parties de-
pending on the stage of the proceeding. 142 For instance, one proposal
134 Weast, 377 F.3d at 455.
139 See id. at 455-56.
Ise
	 at 453.
"7 Id.
138 Id. at 453-54.
139 Weast, 377 F.3d at 454.
140 See id.
141 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 72-77; Anstaett, suns note 23, at 770-72; Womack,
supra note 23, at 215-16; Recent Case, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—Fourth Cir-
cuit Holds That Parents Bear the Burden of Proof in a Due Process Hearing Against a School District:
Weast v. Schaffer, 377 E3d 449 (4th Cie 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1078,1082-85 (2005).
143 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 72-77 (arguing for an allocation that would separate
the burden of proof on substantive and procedural issues); Anstaett, supra note 23, at 770-
72 (calling for an allocation that would only require the parent to discharge the minimal
burden of producing evidence that their student's disability qualified for services under
the IDEA); Recent Case, supra note 141, at 1082-85 (contending that courts should adopt
a burden-shifting scheme similar to that embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act's
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separates the burden of proof on procedural issues from the burden on
substantive issues, suggesting various ways the former might be assigned
to the school district.'" Alternatively, a second proposal analogizes due
process hearings to Social Security disability appeals, contending the
parent should only be required to discharge the initial burden of pro-
ducing evidence of the student's disability.t' 14
 Under this scheme, the
school district would bear the ultimate burden of persuading the fact
finder.145
 Finally, a third proposal contends that the IDEA should in-
corporate a burden-shifting scheme similar to that embodied in the
Americans with Disabilities Act's ("ADA") reasonable accommodation
provision. 1 " Using this approach, after the parent presented a prima
facie case that the student's disability fell into a statutory category, the
burden would shift to the school district to prove that it accommodated
the student's disability through an adequate IEP. 147
An early proposal draws a distinction between the burden of
proof on procedural and substantive issues.'" Insofar as the IDEA is
concerned, this proposal argues that the application of traditional
evidentiary theory is arguably ineffective for procedural issues. 149
 This
proposal contends that the IDEA's elaborate safeguards place an em-
phasis on procedural compliance that justifies imposing the burden
of proving adherence to the statutory requirements on the school dis-
trict. 150
 Several rationales support splitting the burden of proof on
procedural and substantive issues in this manner. 151
First, splitting the burden would be responsive to Board of Educa-
tion v. Rowley, a 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the standard
of review applicable to the IDEA.152 In this leading case, the Court
addressed what the IDEA's "free appropriate public education" man-
date required of schools. 153
 The Court held that schools must provide
(the "ADA") reasonable accommodation provision); see also McCoRmick, supra note 47,
§ 337 (explaining burden-shifting generally).
143 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 72-77.
144
	 Anstaett, supra note 23, at 771.
"3 See id.
"6 See Recent Case, supra note 141, at 1084.
L47 see a
148 She Guernsey, supra note 15, at 72-77.
1"3 See id. at 74-75.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 75-77.
133 See 458 U.S. at 189-201; see also Guernsey, supra note 15, at 75 (describing the or-
ganization of a court's inquiry under Rowley).
155 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A) (2000); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-201; Guernsey, supra
note 15, at 75.
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handicapped students with "some educational benefit," simply a "ba-
sic floor of opportunity."154 In Rowley, the Court also indicated that
judicial review under the IDEA should begin with an inquiry into the
school's compliance with the statute's procedural safeguards. 165
 Thus,
Rowley's primary emphasis on procedural compliance might justify
allocating the burden of proof on this issue to the school district. 166
Second, allocating the burden of proof to the school district to
demonstrate procedural compliance would also be consistent with the
statute's remedial goals.'" The IDEA's procedural safeguards are in-
tegral to providing each disabled student with an enforceable right to
a "free appropriate public education." 168
 Accordingly, the school dis-
trict should be required to demonstrate compliance because the
IDEA explicitly recognizes a desire to protect the rights of disabled
students.'" Third, though parents can access their child's records un-
der the IDEA's procedural provisions, this entitlement falls short of
formal discovery)" Also, this limited disclosure requirement typically
produces records that are more useful on substantive issues and may
not even contain evidence of procedural violations. 161
According to this proposal, two different allocations could be used
to place some of the burden on the school district to disprove allega-
tions of procedural violations.'" One approach is to allocate the bur-
den of production to the school district on this issue, which would re-
spond to the reality that evidence of procedural violations lies almost
exclusively within the school district's control)" Once the school dis-
trict satisfied its burden by producing sufficient evidence to demon-
strate compliance, the burden of persuasion on the issue would then
shift to the parents.'" This scheme, however, might not fully respond to
the contention that the IDEA is expressly remedial)" After all, the
burden of persuasion would still be assigned to the parent, despite the
IDEA's desire to safeguard the student's rights. 166
134
 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
135
 See id. at 206-07.
156 See id.; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 75.
157 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 75-76.
158 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 75-76.
136 See 20 U.S.C.§ 1400(d) (1) (A)—(B); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 75-76.
Jo See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76.
161
 See id.
166 See id. at 76-77.
163 See id. at 76.
164 See id.
165 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76.
168 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A)—(B) (2000); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76.
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A second approach could take the form of a scheme similar to that
used under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 167
 In contrast to the first ap-
proach, the parents would carry the burden of producing evidence
sufficient to reasonably demonstrate a procedural violation.' At that
point, the burden of production would shift to the school district to
produce rebuttal evidence. 169
 Due to the difficulties parents face in as-
sembling proof, the amount of evidence required to meet their burden
could be nominal.'" One proposed standard is that parents should be
required to allege "a specific violation of a procedural right provided by
the Act [the IDEA] or its supporting regulations along with informa-
tion sufficient to allow a reasonable person to infer the existence of
that procedural violation." 171
In opposition to this type of proposal, others argue that parents
who seek to take advantage of the due process rights afforded by the
IDEA should not be forced to bear the burden of persuasion on any
claim.' 72
 One counter-proposal analogizes the IDEA proceedings to
Social Security disability cases because they are an area of administra-
tive law in which the burden of persuasion has been shifted to the
agency to respect the individual's rights.'" This proposal suggests that
the IDEA due process hearings should resemble Social Security dis-
ability appeals, where the claimant is initially required to offer proba-
tive evidence that he cannot work due to a disability, then the agency
must meet its burden of persuasion by demonstrating that feasible
work is available to the claimant. 174
 Applied to a due process hearing,
the parent first would be required to discharge the burden of produc-
ing evidence of the student's disability, but then the ultimate burden
of persuasion would shift to the school district to defend its IEP. 175
This proposal echoes the concern that allocating the burden of per-
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 2000e-1-4; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-03 (1973) (holding that the Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the contested employment action); Guernsey, supra
note 15, at 76-77.
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 2000e-1-4; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; Guernsey,
supra note 15, at 76.
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 2000e-1-4; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; Guernsey,
supra note 15, at 76.
1 " See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 77.
171 See id.
172 SeeAnstaett, supra note 23, at 770-72; Womack, supra note 23, at 215-16.
173 See Anstaett, supra note 23, at 771.
174 Id.
175 See id.
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suasion to the school district is preferable because it is better able to
build its case. 178 Also, a pro-parent standard is arguably necessary for
the IDEA to protect student rights and ensure schools' compliance.'"
Finally, an analysis of the Fourth Circuit's 2004 decision in Weast
proposes that courts should adopt a modified burden-shifting approach
that mirrors that practiced in the ADA's reasonable accommodation
provision."8 Specifically, this analysis rejects any attempt to analogize
the IDEA to civil rights statutes that do not place the burden of proof
on defendants. 179 Unlike civil rights legislation, it contends, the IDEA
imposes "affirmative obligations" on state actors. 18° Accordingly, Weast's
analytical misstep was its failure to appreciate the affirmative obliga-
tions that the IDEA places on school districts. 181 Instead, a modified
burden-shifting approach would ensure that the party in the best posi-
tion to offer evidence will carry an appropriate burden. 182
Drawing a parallel to the ADA's reasonable accommodation provi-
sion, this proposal suggests that the IDEA adopt a regime where the
plaintiff would first have to establish a prima facie case that the stu-
dent's disability falls into an applicable category covered by the stat-
ute. 183
 Upon the parent's satisfaction of this burden, the burden would
shift to the school district to prove its MP's adequacy. 184
 Hence, each
party could carry an appropriate burden—the plaintiff parent because
he or she typically possesses greater knowledge about the student's dis-
ability and the defendant school district because it typically has the ex-
perience and resources to determine how the student's needs might be
met in an educational plan. 188 Thus, this framework hypothesizes that
both parties would bear the burden of proof on matters for which they
have greater access to the relevant information. 188 If the child's eligibil-
ity under the IDEA is not contested, the scheme would allocate the
burden of proof in its entirety to the school district. 187
176 See id at 771-72.
177
 See id.
178 See Weast, 377 F.3d at 452-56; Recent Case, supra note 141, at 1082-85.
179 See Recent Case, supra note 141, at 1082-83.
183
 See id. at 1083-84.
181 See id. at 1083.
It" See id. at 1083-84.
183 See id. at 1084.
184 See Recent Case, supra note 141, at 1084.
196 See id.
1B6 See id.
107 See id.
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III. THE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURAL COMPROMISE: TAILORING THE
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO BALANCE THE IDEA'S
REMEDIAL PURPOSE AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS' OBLIGATIONS
The IDEA and its procedural safeguards aspire to make "a free
appropriate public education" available to all disabled students. 188 Be-
cause the due process hearing is the IDEA's most fundamental proce-
dural safeguard, resolution of this conflict of authority is necessary for
the IDEA's continued effectiveness as a statutory rnandate. 189 Due to
the IDEA's silence regarding the allocation of the burden of proof at
due process hearings, its procedural and substantive requirements
currently cannot function together to promote its goals.'" In addi-
tion, on a practical level the unsettled state of the law discourages
parents from commencing actions to enforce their children's rights,
mainly because they lack sufficient information to calculate their
chances of success. 191 At the same time, due to the lack of uniformity
different jurisdictions arrive at different outcomes depending on
their allocation of the burden of proof, which could inhibit students'
interstate mobility. 192 Although the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari to review this issue, it would be more desirable for Congress to
amend the IDEA's procedural provisions to specify the burden of
proof at due process hearings.'" Congressional amendment would
188 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d) (1) (A), 1415 (2000).
160 See id. §§ 1400(d) (1) (A), 1415; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68, 70-71 (highlighting
the centrality of the FAPE mandate within the IDEA, but observing that the statute pro-
vides little substantive guidance regarding the definition of this critical term); Anstaett,
supra note 23, at 759 (observing that the allocation of the burden of proof at due process
hearings is particularly important because IDEA disputes typically involve conflicting ex-
pert testimony); Goldman, supra note 22, at 280-81 (concluding that the parent's right to
obtain a due process hearing is among the IDEA's most important safeguards); Womack,
supra note 23, at 192-93 (stating that the allocation of the burden of proof has determined
the outcome of many IDEA disputes).
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d) (1) (A), 1415; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68, 70-71; An-
staett, supra note 23, at 759; Goldman, supra note 22, at 280-81; Womack, supra note 23, at
192-93.
191 See Anstaett, supra note 23, at 771-72. As one commentator notes, it is important
that parents be able to calculate their chances of winning an IDEA dispute. Id. The Su-
preme Court has held that parents may be reimbursed for private school tuition when a
court ultimately determines that the child's IEP is inadequate and they had placed their
child at a private school with an appropriate educational program during the pendency of
their appeal. Id. (citing Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-
74 (1985)).
192 See Huefner & Zirkel, supra note 112, at 12.
1" Schaffer v. Weast, 125 S. Ct. 1300 (2005) (granting certiorari).
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allow for a more extended debate that would better incorporate the
sensitive policy considerations at issue.'"
The IDEA struck a delicate balance between respecting the rights
of disabled children while imposing a realistic mandate on school dis-
tricts. 195 The allocation of the burden of proof under the IDEA should
achieve this same balance.'" According to traditional evidentiary doc-
trine, courts should allocate both the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of persuading the fact finder to the plaintiff because
it is the most logical party to risk a failure of proof. 197 Thus, traditional
evidentiary principles imply that the party who challenges the status
quo should bear much of the evidentiary onus in an IDEA dispute.'"
But despite the dictates of traditional evidentiary doctrine, fair-
ness, convenience, and other policy considerations can justify a non-
traditiohal allocation. 199 Moreover, courts may separate the burdens of
production and persuasion and even shift them from one party to the
194 See Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); E.S.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.Sd 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998); Oberti v. Bd, of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204,
1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasizing the school district's relative advantages in IDEA litigation
and the IDEA's desire to protect the rights of students and parents); Fuhrmann v. E.
Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1993); Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 560
A.2d 1180, 1181-82, 1188 (NJ. 1989) (discussing a length the policy concerns that warrant
an assignment of the burden of proof to the school district); Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest
Proposal: Mediating IDEA Disputes Without Splitting the Baby, 28 J.L. & Enuc. 37, 41-43 (1999)
(outlining the various reasons why parents may experience difficulty in winning IDEA dis-
putes); Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Chil-
dren with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 343 (2001) (describing some
parental disadvantages in IDEA litigation); Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LirrrLE ROCK L. key. 35, 41 (1996) (detailing the effect on parents
of the limited discovery provisions for due process hearings); Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82 (explaining why some parents choose not to pursue IDEA due process claims).
195 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d) (1) (A), 1415; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68, 70-71; An-
staett, supra note 23, at 759; Goldman, =PM note 22, at 280-81; Womack, supra note 23, at
192-93; see also supra notes 141-147 and accompanying text (presenting competing schol-
arly proposals responding to the need to tailor the allocation of the burden of proof to the
IDEA's purpose and goals).
' 14 See 20 U.S.C, §§ 1400(d) (1)(A), 1415; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 68, 70-71; Anstaett,
supra note 23, at 759; Goldman, supra note 22, at 280-81; Womack, supra note 23, at 192-93.
197 See McCoRmicx, supra note 47, § 337.
Ns See id.
169 See id. In addition, while it is most natural to place the burden on the party who
urges change, it can also be appropriate under certain circumstances to impose the bur-
dens of production or persuasion on a party when the facts with regard to a certain issue
lie particularly within that party's knowledge. See id. Professor McCormick's treatment of
this proposition, however, classifies it as a near-exception because he also notes that a party
often must plead and prove matters to which the opposing party has superior access to the
relevant proof. See id. It may be warranted under certain circumstances to allocate the two
evidentiary burdens to different parties or to shift the burdens. See id.
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other when necessity dicta.tes."° Due to the affirmative obligations the
IDEA imposes on school districts and the absence of a level eviden-
tiary playing field for parents and school districts, a modified burden-
shifting scheme is appropriate."' In other words, the IDEA's remedial
purpose and substantial fairness considerations warrant a departure
from the traditional allocation of the burden of proof to the plaintiff
to an alternate scheme.202
This departure should assume the form of a modified burden-
shifting framework that would impose tailored burdens on both
school districts and parents. 203
 In modifying the traditional allocation,
a burden-shifting scheme for IDEA due process hearings should com-
pletely separate the burden of proof on substantive and procedural
issues. 204
 Consistent with the IDEA's central emphasis on due process,
the statute should assign the burden for procedural issues to the
school district. 203
 The burden for substantive issues, however, should
rest with the party challenging the status quo, typically the parent. 20°
200 See id.; Anstaett, supra note 23, at 763.
2° 1 See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218-19 (assigning the burden of proof for mainstreaming
claims under the IDEA to school districts due to the statute's "express purpose" of protect-
ing disabled children's rights); Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35; see also Lascari, 560 A.2d at
1181-82,1188 (allocating the burden of proof under New Jersey state law to the local
school district due to the affirmative nature of the obligations the IDEA imposes on
schools); Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43 (detailing parents' relative disadvantages at IDEA
due process hearings); Marchese, supra note 194, at 343 (same); Streett, supra note 194, at
41 (same); Goldman, supra note 22, at 281-82 (same).
2°2 See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218-19; Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35; see also Laseari, 560
A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43; Marchese, supra note 194, at 343;
Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281-82.
2°3 See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218-19; Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35; see also Lascari, 560
A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; McConroacK, supra note 47, § 337 (explaining burden-shifting
more generally); Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43; Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett,
supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281-82.
2414 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 74; supra notes 55-70,89-97 and accompanying text.
2°5
 See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text (outlining the IDEA's procedural
safeguards). "Procedural issues" would include any allegations that the school had failed to
comply with the IDEA's due process safeguards. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000)
(enumerating procedural safeguards). For instance, parents might allege that they had
failed to receive written prior notice regarding a proposal to change their student's IEP. See
id. § 1415(b) (3) (A). Alternatively, parents might allege that the school had failed to pro-
vide them with the opportunity to participate in meetings regarding their child's educa-
tional placement. See id. § 1415 (b) (1)
208 See supra notes 79-80,108-123 and accompanying text. "Substantive issues" would
include any allegations pertaining to the school's obligation under the IDEA to provide
the student with a "free appropriate public education." See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A). In
other words, "substantive issues" would encompass claims related to the sufficiency of the
student's IEP. See id. Also, in some cases, the school district will assume the position of the
challenging party and thus bear the burden for both procedural and substantive issues. See
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Separating the burden of proof in this manner would even the play-
ing field in IDEA disputes but would preserve the integrity of tradi-
tional evidentiary principles, namely the proposition that the plaintiff
must bear the risk of a failure of proof. 2°7
Consequently, the due process hearing would function quite dif-
ferently, as the school district would bear the burdens of production
and persuasion for procedural issues and the parent would bear those
burdens for substantive issues. 208 Operating under this new allocation,
the hearing officer would begin the hearing by examining any proce-
dural claims. 09 For these claims, the officer would require the school
district to satisfy its burden of production by offering sufficient evi-
dence to support a reasonable inference that it complied with the
IDEA's due process safeguards. 21 ° In the officer's final analysis, the
school district would also bear the burden of persuasion. 2" After the
hearing officer addressed the procedural allegations, he or she would
continue the hearing by requiring the challenging party to satisfy its
burden of production on substantive issues. 212 At that point, the parents
would offer sufficient evidence that the school district failed to meet its
statutory obligation under the IDEA to provide their child with a "free
Tatra v. Tex., 703 F.2d 823, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1983). This could occur, for example, when a
school seeks to change a previously agreed-to IEP over parental objection. See id. at 825.
107 See MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 337 (explaining that the traditional assignment of
the burden of proof is to the party challenging the status quo, namely the plaintiff); Win-
MORE, supra note 76, § 2485 (describing the traditional practice of assigning the burden of
proof to the plaintiff).
"a See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1218-19; Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1034-35; see also Lascari, 560
A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43; Marchese, supra note 194, at 343;
Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281-82.
"9 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). Procedural claims would
include any allegations related to the IDEA's due process safeguards. See generally 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415 (enumerating procedural safeguards).
21° See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (enumerating procedural safeguards).
9" See generally id. (enumerating procedural safeguards).
9 ' 9 See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1300
(2005) (assigning burden of proof to parents as the party suing to enforce a statutory obli-
gation); Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the deference the IDEA accords to the child's educators justifies requiring
parents to bear the burden of proof); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d 1022, 1026
(10th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing
that the IDEA demonstrates a legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the
procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished
in the way of substantive content of an IEP," which justifies assigning the burden of proof
to the parent); Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 917 (1st Cir. 1983); Tatro, 703
F.2d at 830 (holding that fairness requires the party challenging the IEP to prove the
plan's inadequacy).
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appropriate public education."213
 The hearing officer would assign the
burden of persuasion on substantive issues to the parents.214
This allocation would respond to the tension between evidentiary
principles, statutory interpretation challenges, and policy considera-
tions that are present in the current circuit split. 215
 Several persuasive
rationales support this modified scheme. 21° First, separating the burden
of proof on procedural and substantive issues would be most consistent
with Congress's legislative intent and the fact that the IDEA is a reme-
dial statute that imposes affirmative obligations upon school districts. 217
Second, this allocation would mirror the delicate policy balance that
the IDEA struck to establish an effective yet realistic mandate for dis-
abled students.218
 Finally, this allocation would possess a practical
adaptability to the type of fact patterns common to IDEA disputes. 219
A. Dividing the Burdens Is Most Consistent with Congress's Legislative Intent
and the IDEA's Remedial Purpose
An evaluation of the IDEA's case law predecessors, Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC) and Mills v. Board of
Education, illuminates Congress's legislative intent. 220
 Although Con-
gress modeled much of what became the IDEA from PARC and Mills,
wholly grafting their procedural safeguards in some cases, it failed to
replicate the cases' allocation of the burden of proof to the educa-
tional agency.221 Thus, given Congress's selective incorporation of
some aspects of PARC and Mills' procedural regimes, it appears that
Congress did not intend to duplicate the cases' allocation of the bur-
den of proof to the local agency. 222
 In other words, the IDEA evi-
dences that Congress copied some of PARC and Mills' procedural
21s
	 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A) (providing that one of the IDEA's purposes is to provide
disabled students with a FAPE); see supra notes 79-80, 108-123 and accompanying text.
214 See Weast, 377 F.3d at 456; Devine, 249 F.3d at 1291-92; Johnson, 921 F,2d at 1026;
Doe v, Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191; Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d at 917; Tatro,
703 F,2d at 830.
21s
	 supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 220-272 and accompanying text.
212 See infra notes 220-235 and accompanying text.
219
 See infra notes 236-265 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 266-272 and accompanying text.
220 See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 343 F. Supp. 279, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
221 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000) (outlining procedural safeguards); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at
880-83; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
222 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (outlining procedural safeguards); Weast, 377 F.3d at 454-55;
Milli, 348 F. Supp. at 880-83; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
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safeguards, but did not do so for others. 229 Thus, by its silence regard-
ing the burden of proof, Congress would appear to have defaulted to
the traditional allocation.224 This would indicate that the plaintiff
should assume a share of the responsibility for producing evidence
and persuading the fact finder. 225
As the courts that adhere to a traditional allocation ha4e ac-
knowledged, the statutory framework of the IDEA itself implies that a
challenging party should bear much of the responsibility for proving
its claims at the due process hearing.226 The IDEA establishes pre-
sumptions in favor of the status quo in several ways. 227 Because the IEP
is the sole mechanism that provides disabled students with a 'Tree ap-
propriate public education," the IEP's centrality endows the plan with
a measure of presumed validity. 228 At the same time, the IDEA con-
tains little in the way of substantive requirements, suggesting a defer-
ence to local educators that is not overridden by the statute's proce-
dural safeguards. 229 Finally, the IDEA's stay-put provision, which
requires that students remain in their current educational placements
during any appeals, further reflects the IDEA's subscription to the
norm that the IEP is presumptively valid. 2"
Although the IDEA is silent as to who bears the burden of proof at
the due process hearing, the statute does specify its remedial goals
clearly and imposes affirmative obligations upon school districts. 231 In
short, the IDEA consists of a rather vague affirmative obligation—the
provision of a "free appropriate public education"—that is accom-
plished by the enforcement of an elaborate system of procedural safe-
"9 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (outlining procedural safeguards); Weast, 377 F.3d at 454-55;
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 880-83; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
"9 See 20 U.S.C, § 1415 (outlining procedural safeguards); Weast, 377 F.3d at 454-55;
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 880-83; PARC 343 F. Supp. at 305.
t15 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (outlining procedural safeguards); Weast, 377 F.3d at 454-55;
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 880-83; PARC 343 F. Supp. at 305.
226 See Weast,  377 F.3d at 456; Renner v. Bd, of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999);
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993); Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 933 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (5th Cir. 1991); Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026; Cordrey
v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1469-70 (6th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191;
Alamo Heights Indep, Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ„ 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986);
Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d at 917; Tatty, 703 F.2d at 830,
u7 See infra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
229 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2000); Tatra, 703 F.2d at 830.
229
 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189,195, 208; Guernsey, supra note 15, at 69-72.
230 See Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d at 917.
231 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 1414(d), 1415; suinu notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
618	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:591
guards.232
 Thus, the IDEA reflects the presumption that so long as its
procedures are followed by participating schools, the end-product will
be a plan that provides for the student's needs and thus accomplishes
the statute's remedial goal. 233
 Consequently, the IDEA places a premium
on due process that justifies a departure from the traditional allocation
of the burden of proof to a modified burden-shifting approach. 234 Be-
cause the IDEA's provisions so strongly emphasize the need for proce-
dural compliance, it is appropriate to assign the burdens of production
and persuasion on procedural issues to the school district. 238
B. Competing Fairness Considerations Call for Splitting the Burden Rather
Than Assigning It Completely to the School District
A modified burden-shifting scheme is also responsive to the real-
ity that there is not a level evidentiary playing field between parents
and school districts.236
 Requiring the school district to produce evi-
dence and ultimately to prove its own procedural compliance ac-
knowledges the practical realities of litigation under the IDEA. 237 As
even the courts that have allocated the burden of proof entirely to the
parent have observed, school districts can easily out-maneuver parents
in IDEA disputes. 238
 Nonetheless, although school districts undoubt-
edly remain the more sophisticated party in IDEA disputes, they are
also subject to substantial policy pressures in balancing their
232 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 1414(d), 1415; supra notes 14-16, 55-75 and accompany-
ing text.
233 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (enumerating procedural safe-
guards).
254
 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (enumerating procedural safe-
guards).
235 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; sce also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (enumerating procedural safe-
guards).
238 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; E.S., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
257 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; E.S., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
233 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; E.S., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
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affirmative obligations to all their students. 239 Due process hearings
already impose high costs that caution against allocating the burden
of proof in its entirety to the school district?"
Thus, a modified scheme would first compensate for some of the
IDEA's procedural deficiencies, evening the playing field in the par-
ent's favor."' Although the IDFA's procedural safeguards aspire to
produce parity between school districts and parents, it does not ex-
ist.242 The IDEA entitles parents to receive a "procedural safeguards
notice" containing a plain language explanation of their rights upon
the student's initial referral for evaluation, but such a notice hardly
equips a parent to handle the intricacies of the hearing process. 243
Parents may be ineffective in challenging an IEP for many reasons. 2"
First, though the IDEA mandates parental access to their child's
educational records and provides for the disclosure of any evaluations
five days before the hearing, these provisions do not possess the rigor
of the discovery process involved in civil litigation.20 One difficulty
here is that the school district typically exerts direct control over those
records, which are often only helpful in proving procedural viola-
tions.2" Additionally, school districts control the witnesses that would
be critical to a successful hearing. 247
 Second, parents often lack
239 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; E.S., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A,2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
249 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; ES., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
241 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; E.S., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrrnann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
242 See Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; ES., 135 F.3d at 569; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Fuhrmann,
993 F.2d at 1034-35; Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1181-82, 1188; Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43;
Marchese, supra note 194, at 343; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at
281-82.
243 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (2000); see also Goldman, supra note 22, at 281 (explaining
that although the IDEA provides parents with various rights to information, parents may
still be unable to obtain the facts they need to succeed at a hearing).
244 See Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-43; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281-82; see also infra
notes 245-255 and accompanying text (outlining the difficulties of IEP litigation from the
parent's perspective).
245 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76; Streett, supra note 194, at 41.
545 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76; Streett, supra note 194, at 41.
247 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2); Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76; Streett, supra note 194, at 41.
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sufficient expertise or resources to critique the specific failures of the
EEP.2" It is often difficult for them to identify alternative educational
strategies or placements that would better suit their child, and the MP
process relies extensively on technical jargon to discuss the child's de-
velopment.249
 The IDEA's due process hearings are frequently won on
technicalities that require a mastery of this language. 25°
Third, a due process hearing requires financial resources. 251
 Re-
taining an attorney and hiring experts represent substantial costs, de-
spite the IDEA's provisions that award attorney's fees to prevailing
parents and require school districts to inform parents of low-cost legal
and advocacy services. 252
 Fourth, the sheer length of the appeals pro-
cess deters some parents, especially when a due process challenge can
endure for several months or even years. 253 The due process system
also imposes emotional pressures on parents, including the discom-
fort that can result when they must challenge educators with whom
they have worked. 254
 A related problem that parents often encounter
is the perception among school personnel that they cannot be trusted
to be "objective" about their child's education. 255
At the same time, due process hearings produce strong policy
ramifications for school districts that the existing federal circuit courts
of appeals' case law and scholarly literature do not fully elaborate. 256
Although many argue that allocating the burden of proof to the chal-
lenging party might result in assigning parents a burden they are
unequipped to meet, allocating the entire burden to school districts
would similarly impose a heavy burden on the school districts. 257
 Due
process hearings are extremely costly to school districts, and they di-
vert scarce resources from other educational expenditures.258 Each
new IDEA claim represents a commitment of additional resources
school districts must divert to hire attorneys and experts to defend
their placements, adding to the already substantial education costs of
248 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76; Streett, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note
22, at 281. Steven Marchese states that "these parents may be unable to understand their
children's placements, let alone articulate different ones.' Marchese, supra note 194, at 343.
249 See Marchese, supra note 194, at 343.
2" See id. at 343-44.
251 Bleyer, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281.
252 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(i) (3) (B); Beyer, supra note 194, at 41; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281.
253
 Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-42; Goldman, supra note 22, at 281-82.
54 Beyer, supra note 194, at 41-42.
255 Marchese, supra note 194, at 343-44.
256 See infra notes 257-265 and accompanying text.
2" See Beyer, supra note 194, at 42; Morgan, supra note 5, at 287.
253 See Morgan, supra note 5, at 287.
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students with disabilities.259 Such costs limit the pool of resources
available for substantive rather than procedural expenditures. 260
In short, if the hearing process becomes too burdensome for
school districts, it might diminish rather than increase school districts'
ability to meet their affirmative statutory obligations. 26i The stakes for
school districts at due process hearings can be extremely high. 252 Cur-
rent law entitles prevailing parents to private tuition reimburse-
ment. 265 Essentially, parents can reject a public school's IEP, place
their student in a private school, and successfully require the public
school system to finance their child's education if a court ultimately
determines that the IEP was not designed to provide the student with
a "free appropriate public education."264 Thus, although some suggest
that allocating the entire burden of proof to school districts is neces-
sary to ensure their procedural compliance, school districts already
have a strong financial incentive to meet their statutory obligations,
both procedural and substantive 265
C. Dividing the Burdens Is a Better Fit for the Common IDEA Fact Pattern
Finally, a modified allocation would also incorporate enough
flexibility to allow it to be adapted to the fact patterns that are com-
mon to IDEA disputes.m A successful allocation of the burden of
proof at due process hearings under the IDEA must be tailored to
meet the statute's unique challenges, rather than imported from an-
269 Beyer, supra note 194, at 42.
266 See Beyer, supra note 194, at 42; Morgan, supra note 5, at 287.
261 See supra notes 256-260 and accompanying text.
262 See infra notes 264-265 and accompanying text.
266 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-74.
264 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2000); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-74.
255 See 20 U.S.C.§ 1414(d); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-74.
4e6 See Wean, 377 F.3d at 450-52. In Weast, for example, the parents of a child with At-
tention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and learning disabilities had their child evaluated by
a public middle school to determine his eligibility for special education services under the
IDEA. Id. at 450. The school determined that the student's disabilities qualified and then
prepared an IEP. Id. at 450-51. Dissatisfied with the terms of the proposed plan, the par-
ents enrolled the student in a private school and then sought tuition reimbursement by
bringing a claim in federal court alleging that the proposed IEP was not designed to pro-
vide the child with a FAPE. Id. Thus, the central dispute between the parties did not con-
cern the child's eligibility; instead, its focus was whether the proposed IEP satisfied the
IDEA's FAPE mandate. Id.; see Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207-08, 1220-24 (addressing whether
the school complied with the IDEA when it relocated the student to a segregated special
education class, not whether student's disability qualified for services); Tatro, 703 F.2d at
825, 830 (addressing whether the IDEA required the school to provide related medical
services, not whether the student's disability was eligible).
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other statutory source, such as civil rights legislation or even other
disability mandates. 267
 Under the burden-shifting schemes common to
other disability statutes, once the plaintiff has established that his or
her disability meets the statutory definition, the entire burden then
shifts to the defendant to prove that it accommodated that disabil-
ity.268
 On a practical level, this approach would be ill-suited to balanc-
ing children's rights and school districts' needs, mainly because in
most due process hearings the parties concede that the student's dis-
ability qualifies for assistance under the IDEA. 266
 Instead, the focal
point of most hearings concerns whether the school's IEP is designed
to provide the disabled student with a "free appropriate public educa-
tion."27o Thus, if the burden shifted to the school district once the
parent established that the student's disability qualified for assistance,
the burden of proof would almost always rest with the school dis-
trict."' For this reason, no substantive reallocation of the burden of
proof would actually result. 272
CONCLUSION
The conflict of authority regarding the proper allocation of the
burden of proof at initial due process hearings under the IDEA must
be resolved in order for the IDEA to serve as an effective mandate for
disabled students and their parents. Whether a new allocation is pro-
duced through Supreme Court review or by Congress's amendment
of the IDEA, a modified burden-shifting scheme would best mirror
the IDEA's delicate balancing of the rights of disabled children and
227 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76-77; Anstaett, supra note 23. at 771; Recent Case,
supra note 191, at 1083-84.
262 See Guernsey, supra note 15, at 76-77; Anstaett, supra note 23, at 771; Recent Case,
supra note 141, at 1083-84.
169 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (A) (defining "child with a disability" broadly to include
mental retardation; hearing, speech, language, orthopedic, visual, or other health im-
pairments; serious emotional disturbances; autism; and specific learning disabilities).
270
 See, e.g., ES., 135 F.3d at 567-68,569 (addressing whether the school district was
required to provide one-one-on tutoring using a specific instructional method in order to
provide student with a FAPE); Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1155-58 (indicating that issue was
not whether student's disability qualified under the IDEA, but whether school district was
required to provide summer services to handicapped child in order to satisfy the FAPE
mandate).
271 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (A); Weast, 377 F.3d at 450-52; ES., 135 F.3d at 567-68, 569;
Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207-08, 1220-24; Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1155-58; Tatra, 703 F.2d at
825,830.
272 See MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 337 (detailing the traditional allocation of the
burden of proof to the plaintiff); WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 2485 (same).
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the need to impose a realistic mandate on school districts. Consistent
with traditional evidentiary principles, the party challenging the status
quo should bear the burden of proof on all substantive issues. On
procedural issues, however, the school districts should bear the bur-
den of proof to better respond to the IDEA's remedial purpose and its
premium on procedural compliance.
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